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In this paper we investigate the correct magnitude of pain and suffering damages for personal 
injuries. These damages differ greatly between and within countries, and the law of damages 
does not provide a framework to assess the correctness of the granted amounts. In our view, 
Law and Economics in combination with Health Economics is able to provide the required 
external framework. 
In the Law and Economics literature, a tension exists between the prevention theory (stating 
that the injurer should fully compensate non-pecuniary losses) and the insurance theory (stat-
ing that the victim should not receive compensation for non-pecuniary losses, because he 
would not self-insure against these losses). We discuss the scarce literature that suggests a 
synthesis between these two theories: by basing damages on the amount that victims would 
spend in order to reduce the expected non-pecuniary accident losses, the injurer receives the 
correct incentives and the victim is not over-compensated. The Law and Economics litera-
ture, however, lacks a framework to connect the magnitude of the damages to the injuries of 
the victim. 
The concept of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) from the domain of Health Economics 
can fill this gap. A QALY expresses the value of living one year in a certain health condition. 
By studying Health Economics literature, the impact of different health conditions on the 
quality of life may be assessed. By subsequently monetizing QALYs, this impact is expressed 
in monetary terms, thereby providing a non-arbitrary basis for pain and suffering damages. 
We compare the amounts granted in pain and suffering damages in several European coun-
tries with the amounts that would result from a conservative estimation of the monetary value 
of a QALY for specific types of personal injuries. The conclusion is that the amounts that are 
currently awarded are (much) too low from a perspective of deterrence, but also from the 
more traditional legal compensation point of view. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we will address the question what the correct magnitude of damages for immate-
rial losses is from the point of view of Law and Economics and Health Economics. We limit 
ourselves to damages in tort law as a result of physical injuries. We will use the term ‘pain 
and suffering damages’ throughout the paper. In order to be able to answer this question, clar-
ity regarding the goals of pain and suffering damages is needed. After all, only if it is clear 
what is intended with those damages, one can assess how high they should be in order to be 
able to reach that goal. 
This paper is aimed at lawyers as well as legal economists. In our view, the insights offered 
in the Law and Economics literature are valuable to lawyers working in the field of tort dam-
ages. We will therefore sketch the economic analysis of tort law and of pain and suffering 
damages in Section 2. Here we will spend attention to the goals of tort law from a legal and a 
Law and Economics perspective. We will also discuss the debate in Law and Economics lit-
erature whether a victim who suffers immaterial loss should receive any compensation in the 
first place. In Section 3 we will treat the Law and Economics view regarding the correct 
magnitude of pain and suffering damages. In Section 4 we discuss the concept of Quality Ad-
justed Life Years (QALY), which expresses the gravity of different health conditions. This 
concept, which is well-known in the field of Health Economics, in our view, provides impor-
tant information regarding pain and suffering damages, yet it has not sufficiently penetrated 
the Law and Economics discussions on this topic.1 In Section 5 we will compare the magni-
tude of pain and suffering damages in concrete cases in different European countries with our 
theoretical findings. We will not reach an exact determination of the ‘correct magnitude’ of 
pain and suffering damages, because the existing research does not allow such a conclusion. 
What does become clear, however, is that the amounts as they are awarded are too low from a 
Law and Economics and Health Economics perspective. In Section 6, we conclude. 
 
 
2. Pain and Suffering Damages in the Law and Economics Literature 
 
2.1 Goals of Tort Law 
 
In legal literature, a multitude of goals is attributed to tort law, such as compensation, ap-
peasement (satisfaction), punishment, avoiding unjustified enrichment, maintaining subjec-
tive rights, deterrence and loss spreading. Traditionally, compensation is regarded as the most 
important goal. For the topic of pain and suffering damages, appeasement is the most relevant 
                                                
1 Miller has suggested to use QALYs as a technique that forensic experts can apply to help guide jury valuations 
on quality of life losses. Miller describes several existing QALY scales and argues that per case, depending on 
the injuries of the victim, different scales might be applied. Then, experts by using the selected scale have to 
evaluate the plaintiff's functional and psychological loss (by polling the plaintiff and possibly his caregivers and 
by examining existing surveys or even by surveying people similar to the victim) and subsequently convert it 
into QALY loss. Our paper differs from Millers approach in the sense that we propose to use the general QALY 
weights as they can be found in health economics literature, without estimating them in each and every individ-
ual case. The costs of doing so in our view would be very high. We also use a much lower monetary value for a 
QALY than Miller does, to reduce the risk of overestimating non-pecuniary losses. In our view, QALYs offer a 
good starting point in the assessment of pain and suffering damages, because they focus on the duration and 
intensity of the health impairment. However, courts should have the possibility to also include other relevant 
factors into the final assessment. Our paper leaves more room for this than Miller's more detailed approach does. 
Finally, we provide a comparison of the QALY-based approach with the outcome of concrete cases in several 
European countries. See T.R. Miller, ‘Valuing Nonfatal Quality of Life Losses with Quality-Adjusted Life 
Years: The Health Economist's Meow’, (13) Journal of Forensic Economics 2000, p. 145-167. 
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goal besides compensation.2 According to Williams, this ‘safety valve function’ of tort law is 
nowadays only of minor importance.3
In the Law and Economics approach, compensation of losses is not regarded as a separate 
goal, but rather as a means with which the goals of deterrence and loss spreading are aimed 
for.4 The prospect of having to pay damages may induce actors to take precautionary meas-
ures that can lower the accident probability and/or the magnitude of the losses. They also may 
decide to engage in the activity less often. Losses that still materialize may be transferred to 
the injurer through the duty to pay damages. If the injurer has better opportunities to spread 
the losses (through, e.g., a liability insurance, or if it regards a producer, through the price of 
the product), liability also contributes to the goal of loss spreading. The overall goal is mini-
mization of the total accident costs. These consist of the costs of precautionary measures plus 
the losses that are expected to still occur (the so-called primary accident cost), the costs of 
having to bear the losses, which may be reduced by a better spread (the secondary costs) and 
the costs of the legal system (the tertiary costs).5 Appeasement in the sense that the victim 
derives utility from the knowledge that the injurer suffers negative financial consequences of 
his behavior plays no role in the economic analysis of tort law. In as far as such appeasement 
is sought, it should be reached through the use of criminal law.6
 
 
2.2 The Limited Importance of an Accurate Assessment of Damages  
 
From a Law and Economics point of view, the law of damages is assessed in the light of the 
goal of minimizing total accident costs. In order to provide a potential injurer with the correct 
behavioral incentives regarding his care and activity level, he should face all possible nega-
tive consequences of his behavior. This implies that in principle, damages should fully com-
pensate the victim. In case damages are systematically incomplete, the injurer will take too 
little care or engage in his activity too often. This problem exists for instance in case of fatal 
accidents, where damages do not encompass the value the deceased himself attached to his 
life.7 On the other hand, damages that are systematically too high cause the opposite prob-
lems. This can happen, for example, if an actor can be held fully liable, even if there is uncer-
tainty regarding the question if his behavior has caused the losses.8
This, however, does not necessarily mean that damages have to be assessed as accurately as 
possible in each and every individual case, because that may be too costly. The desired level 
of accuracy is determined by a weighing of the additional costs of more accuracy in the de-
termination of damages on the one hand, and the additional benefits thereof in the sense of 
                                                
2 S.D. Lindenbergh, Smartengeld, Deventer: Kluwer 1998, p. 29 ff. and Lindenbergh, Smartengeld tien jaar 
later, Deventer: Kluwer 2008, p. 3 ff; C. van Dam, European Tort Law, Oxford and New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2006, p.302-303. 
3 G. Williams, ‘The aims of the law of tort’, (4) Current Legal Problems 1951, p. 138; M. Lunney and K. Ol-
iphant, Tort law: Text and materials, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 20.  
4 See e.g. R.A. Posner, ‘A Theory of Negligence’, (1) Journal of Legal Studies 1972, p. 33; G. Calabresi, The 
Costs of Accidents. A Legal and Economic Analysis, 5th printing, New Haven: Yale University Press 1977, p. 26 
ff; H.-B. Schäfer and C. Ott, Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts, 4th edition, Berlin: Springer 
2005, p. 125 ff; R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law and Economics, 5th ed., USA: Pearson Addison Wesley 2008, p. 
325 ff. 
5 Calabresi 1977, p. 24 ff. 
6 C. Ott and H.-B. Schäfer, ‘Schmerzensgeld bei Körperverletzungen. Eine ökonomische Analyse’, Juristenzei-
tung 1990, p. 573. 
7 See W.V.H. Rogers, ‘Comparative Report’, in: W.V.H. Rogers (ed.), Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in a 
Comparative Perspective, Vienna: Springer 2001, p. 247.  
8 See e.g. S. Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press 2004, p. 255. 
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better deterrence and spreading of losses on the other. More accurate assessment of damages 
can only improve the incentives of the tortfeasor, if the latter also has this better assessment 
at his disposal. If the tortfeasor does not know in advance the magnitude of the losses he can 
cause, a more accurate assessment ex post cannot provide better incentives ex ante. As long 
as the damages on average are assessed correctly, the potential tortfeasor who bases his deci-
sions on assessments of the average loss will receive the correct incentives.9
Hence, the losses have to be assessed correctly on average. Systematic over- and underesti-
mations have to be avoided, to prevent excessive or inadequate behavioral incentives. This 
implies that damages for pain and suffering do not have to be determined as precisely as pos-
sible in each separate case, so that it is possible to utilize standardized amounts.10 This fits 
the Dutch Coma-case,11 where the Supreme Court considers that in assessing the losses, one 
should abstract from the concrete experience of the victim and should assess in a more objec-
tive manner to what extent immaterial losses exist. Standardization lowers the tertiary costs 
because fewer resources are spent on the assessment of damages, but also because the higher 
predictability of the damages may induce parties to settle at an earlier stage, which is less 
costly than litigating.12 The improved predictability may also lower primary accident costs, 
because uncertainty regarding the damages can cause parties to take excessive care.13 Secon-
dary accident costs are lowest if the losses are optimally spread. This implies that the optimal 
level of damages for the victim has to be determined. Hence, primary costs regard the optimal 
amount that the injurer should pay to receive the correct incentives, while secondary costs 
regard the optimal amount that the victim should receive. These two amounts are not neces-
sarily identical, even though in practice they are coupled. In Section 2.3, we will discuss the 
possible tension between the two amounts in greater detail. 
 
 
2.3 Damages for Immaterial Losses: Pay, but not Receive? 
 
In the economic analysis of law, the distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses 
is made as follows. In case of a pecuniary loss, the victim loses money or replaceable goods. 
The damages received by the victim make up for the loss in money or enable him to replace 
the lost goods. In case of a non-pecuniary loss, non-replaceable ‘goods’ are lost or dam-
aged.14 The damages received by the victim hence do not enable him to replace the lost 
goods. The money does yield him utility, but it does not mend the immaterial losses. 
Two approaches exist regarding the question whether the immaterial losses should be com-
pensated. We will discuss both approaches below.  
 
 
The Prevention Theory 
In order to provide the potential injurer with the correct behavioral incentives, he has to com-
pensate both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, because both types constitute losses to the 
victim. If the injurer does not face both types of losses in the expected damages, he does not 
                                                
9 L. Kaplow and S. Shavell, ‘Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages’, (39) Journal of Law and Economics 
1996, p. 194. 
10  On the issue of standardization, also see Rogers 2001, p. 272 ff. 
11 Supreme Court 20 September 2002, NJ 2004, 112. 
12 R.R. Bovbjerg, F.A. Sloan and J.F. Blumstein, ‘Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffer-
ing”‘, (83) Northwestern University Law Review 1989, p. 925; F.S. Levin, ‘Pain and Suffering Guidelines: A 
Cure for Damages Measurement “Anomie”‘, (22) University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 1989, p. 320. 
13 Bovbjerg, Sloan and Blumstein 1989, p. 925; Levin 1989, p. 309, 310. 
14; See e.g. J. Arlen, ‘Tort Damages’, in: B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Eco-
nomics. Volume II. Civil Law and Economics, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2000, p. 702; Shavell 2004, p. 242. 
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fully internalize the negative externalities of his behavior, and tort law cannot reach its pre-
ventive goal then.15 Adams argues that in cases where also the victim should receive behav-
ioral incentives (the so-called bilateral accident situations, this in contrast to the unilateral 
accident situations where only the injurer can influence the accident probability and/or sever-
ity), immaterial losses should not be compensated. This provides him with an incentive to 
take precautionary measures, even if they are not visible so that they cannot be triggered by a 
defense of comparative or contributory negligence.16 In our view, this line of reasoning is 
problematic, because the incentives for the injurer diminish by not incorporating immaterial 
losses in the damages payment.17 We therefore think it is preferable to let the injurer pay for 
both types of losses, unless the influence of the victim on the occurrence of the accident was 




The Insurance Theory 
The above said does not necessarily mean that the victim should receive damages for immate-
rial losses. This will sound strange to most lawyers, because damages paid by the injurer usu-
ally are received by the victim. From a Law and Economics perspective, however, the rele-
vant question is whether people would want to insure themselves against immaterial losses. If 
they would not, then tort law should not force such coverage upon them.18  
People want to insure themselves against pecuniary losses, because after such losses have oc-
curred, they have less wealth left. Due to the decreasing marginal utility of wealth, the value 
of an additional Euro is lower, the higher the wealth level. After all, with the first Euros that 
someone acquires, he will fulfill his most important needs. With additional money, less im-
portant needs are satisfied. An insurance against pecuniary losses enables a person to spend 
pre-accident Euros with a relatively low marginal value on the insurance premium. If the 
losses actually materialize, the insurance pays the agreed amount of Euros which, due to the 
decrease in wealth have a relatively high marginal value. The loss in utility caused by the 
payment of the premium weighs less heavily than the chance of suffering a larger utility loss 
due to the decrease in wealth in absence of insurance.  
In case of non-pecuniary loss, the marginal utility of money does not increase, because the 
victim does not lose wealth. Marginal utility might even decrease, if the victim after the acci-
dent cannot enjoy his money to the same extent as before. People do not want to insure 
against non-pecuniary losses, because the utility they lose due to payment of the premium is 
not offset by a higher expected utility after receiving the insurance benefits.19 Because people 
do not want to insure themselves, they should not receive compensation for such losses 
through the tort system. After all, that would lead to an increase in prices of products, ser-
vices and liability insurance premiums, resulting in a veiled insurance. 
Croley and Hanson argue that people do want to insure against non-pecuniary losses, because 
such losses lower their overall utility level. In the post-accident situation they may value 
money higher than before, even though their wealth has remained intact.20 In as far as people 
                                                
15 Idem. 
16 M. Adams, ‘Warum kein Ersatz von Nichtvermögensschäden?’, in: C. Ott & H.-B. Schäfer (red.), 
Allokationseffizienz in der Rechtsordnung, Berlijn: Springer-Verlag 1989, p. 215. 
17 Adams acknowledges this problem for situations where the losses almost fully consist of immaterial losses, 
see Adams 1989, p. 217. 
18 Ott and Schäfer 1990, p. 568. 
19 D.D. Friedman, ‘What is ‘Fair Compensation’ for Death or Injury?’, (2) International Review of Law and 
Economics 1982, p. 82 ff.; Adams 1989, p. 215; Ott and Schäfer 1990, p. 567 and Shavell 2004, p. 270 ff. 
20 S.P. Croley and J.D. Hanson, ‘The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort 
Law’, (108) Harvard Law Review 1995, p. 1815.  
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do not take out such insurance in practice, this is, according to the authors, caused by a lack 
of information (regarding, e.g., the possible extent of the non-pecuniary losses, the probabil-
ity of such losses occurring and the amount of compensation that is then desired), because it 
is socially not accepted to attach a price to pain and sorrow, or due to legal restrictions.21 
Other possible explanations of why people do not regularly take out insurance against non-
pecuniary losses are the fact that tort liability already covers immaterial losses to a certain 
extent so that there is less need for a separate insurance, as well as the problems that insurers 
face as a result of limited monitoring possibilities in countering the problems of moral hazard 
and adverse selection.22  
Pryor argues that the conclusion from the insurance theory that the marginal utility of money 
remains the same or even decreases after suffering non-pecuniary losses is flawed. First, em-
pirical research in this area is based on the viewpoint of nondisabled who have to assess the 
situation if they would be disabled. Given their informational problems, Pryor doubts whether 
they can provide accurate statements about marginal utility of money after a disability.23  She 
assesses that these problems will lead to an underestimation of the marginal utility.24 Fur-
thermore, she argues that the distinction between pecuniary losses and non-pecuniary losses 
will often be hard to make, so that the insurance theory does not provide clear guidelines re-
garding which part of the losses should be compensated and which part not.25
 
 
3. The Correct Magnitude of Pain and Suffering Damages from a Law and Economics 
Perspective 
 
3.1 Synthesis between Prevention and Insurance Theory 
 
According to the prevention theory, the injurer should compensate the immaterial losses he 
has caused, because otherwise he receives inadequate care incentives. According to the insur-
ance theory, the victim should not receive compensation, because he would not have self-
insured against these losses and tort law should not force coverage upon him. In our view, a 
synthesis between both theories exists. 
The nuances of Croley and Hanson suggest that people would like to take out a certain 
amount of coverage against immaterial losses and do so in practice. The problems that hinder 
the realization of a proper functioning insurance market are much less relevant in a tort law 
setting. Potential victims do not have to make ex ante assessments of the probability and ex-
tent of immaterial losses, because tort law operates ex post. Potential injurers, in as far as 
they supply products or services, can incorporate the average of these expected damages in 
their prices.26 Furthermore, there is much less resistance against incorporating pain and suf-
fering damages in tort damages than against taking out insurance against such losses.27 In ad-
dition, Pryor argues that marginal utility might increase after suffering immaterial losses so 
that rational people would cover (part of) these losses by an insurance. The tension between 
prevention theory and insurance theory hence is much less strong that it appeared at first 
sight. 
                                                
21 Croley and Hanson 1995, p. 1845 ff. 
22 Bovbjerg, Sloan and Blumstein 1989, p. 934.  
23 E.S. Pryor, ‘The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the Ill: A Critique of the Insurance Theory 
of Compensation’, (79) Virginia Law Review 1993, p. 110ff.  
24 Pryor 1993, p. 117.  
25 Pryor 1993, p. 125 ff.  
26 Croley and Hanson 1995, p. 1898. 
27 Croley and Hanson 1995, p. 1906 ff. 
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Several authors offer a further solution for the alleged tension.28 It is important to realize that 
someone who does not want to fully insure against immaterial losses because the premium is 
too high, is nonetheless willing to spend resources on measures that can lower the expected 
immaterial losses. The following quote from Posner fits this idea: ‘We disagree with those 
students of tort law who believe that pain and suffering are not real costs and should not be 
allowable items of damages in a tort suit. No one likes pain and suffering and most people 
would pay a good deal of money to be free from them. If they were not recoverable in dam-
ages, the cost of negligence would be less to the tortfeasor and there would be more negli-
gence, more accidents, more pain and suffering, and hence higher social costs.’29 The rele-
vant question then becomes how much efforts a potential victim would spend in reducing the 
expected immaterial losses. The resulting amount is, from the prevention point of view, the 
correct measure for the damages that the injurer should pay. After all, if the injurer is induced 
to take the same measures as the victim would have taken himself, then the former has cor-
rectly internalized the externalities. This amount, at the same time, is the correct measure for 
the damages that the victim should receive. The resulting increase in prices or premiums 
which the victim may face due to the inclusion of immaterial losses in the damages payments, 
are based on the amount he himself would have spent if he would have been the one taking 
the precautionary measures. Different than with ex post compensation of the full immaterial 
losses, this ex ante determined amount of compensation does not yield a higher level of cov-
erage than the victim would have chosen himself!30  
It is important to realize that the total costs that someone is willing to spend on reducing the 
expected accident losses are not only determined by the non-pecuniary losses, but also by the 
pecuniary losses. We will return to this issue in the next section. 
 
 
3.2 The Correct Magnitude of Pain and Suffering Damages 
 
Pain and suffering damages have to be based, according to the above-explained line of rea-
soning, on the resources that the victim would have spent himself on reducing the expected 
accident losses. If someone, for example, due to the risk of immaterial losses would have 
spent €1,000 on precautionary measures which lower the probability of an accident in which 
he gets paralyzed by a half per mil, statistically this implies that the value of avoiding the pa-
ralysis amounts to € 2 million (€1,000 / 0.0005). The pain and suffering damages to be paid 
for paralyzing the victim hence should also amount to € 2 million.31
There exists an extensive literature on the ‘value of a statistical life’ (VSL), in which it is in-
vestigated how much costs people are willing to bear to reduce the probability of fatal acci-
dents.32 This literature offers a first step in answering the question regarding the correct mag-
nitude of pain and suffering damages. The VSL is derived from decisions which people take 
and which influence health and safety, such as buying a dangerous product or choosing a 
dangerous job. Such choices contain an implicit tradeoff between money and safety. On the 
basis of these tradeoffs, the VSL is estimated. The resulting amounts differ greatly, but ac-
                                                
28 Bovbjerg, Sloan and Blumstein 1989, p. 913 footnote 31; M. Geistfeld, ‘Placing a Price on Pain and Suffer-
ing: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries’, (83) California Law 
Review 1995, p. 779; Schäfer and Ott 2005, p. 371. 
29 Kwasny v. United States, 823 F.2d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1987). 
30 Schäfer and Ott 2005, p. 373. 
31 Schäfer and Ott 2005, p. 371. Also see Friedman 1982, p. 85 and 91. 
32  For a review article, see e.g. W.K. Viscusi and J.E. Aldy, ‘The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review 
of Market Estimates throughout the World’, (27) The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2003, p. 5-76. 
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cording to Sunstein, the VSL is set at about €5.9 million.33 This amount encompasses both 
the pecuniary and the non-pecuniary losses. Miller argued in 1989 that of the VSL, which he 
assessed at $ 2 million on the basis of the then existing literature, about $1-1.5 million con-
sists of immaterial losses.34 Extrapolating to more recent estimates of the VSL, about €3.0-
4.4 million would consist of immaterial losses. According to Viscusi, non-pecuniary losses 
constitute about 40% of the total losses in product liability cases and 75% in medical mal-
practice cases. This is about the same order of magnitude as Millers results. 
As we have mentioned above, the VSL is only a first step in answering the question regarding 
the correct magnitude of pain and suffering damages. At least two additional steps have to be 
taken. First, one should realize that pain and suffering damages in many cases do not refer to 
fatal accidents, but to non-fatal injuries. Second, many injuries may heal over time so that the 
resulting non-pecuniary loss is, at least in part, temporary in nature. The pain and suffering 
damages in such cases should therefore also be based on the duration of the injuries.  
To start with this last point, even though the VSL cannot take account of the time factor be-
cause it only relates to death, the so-called ‘value of a statistical life year’ (VSLY) does con-
tain a time related factor. In essence, the VSLY is derived by dividing the VSL by the life 
expectancy of the subject of research. If the VSLY is applied, damages for fatal accidents 
would be lower for older victims, which could be regarded as an undesirable consequence. 
For pain and suffering damages for non-fatal accidents, this need not be problematic, because 
those damages should be connected to the losses of the victim. For shorter lasting injuries, be 
it because the injury itself lasts shorter or because the victim has a lower remaining life ex-
pectancy due to his higher age, it makes sense to lower the pain and suffering damages ac-
cordingly. The VSL is not suited for this, the VSLY is. Research that tries to attach a mone-
tary value to the VSLY often results in amounts of about €87,500 to €204,000.35 If, in order 
to determine the fraction of immaterial losses, the same extrapolation method is used as with 
the VSL, amounts of about €43,750 to €153,000 result. 
The VSL and VSLY refer to fatal accidents. For cases with very serious injuries, where re-
search shows that the large majority of the respondents regards the results as comparable or 
more serious than death, pain and suffering damages should be in the order of magnitude of 
the VSL/VSLY. For less serious injuries, pain and suffering damages should be proportion-
                                                
33 C.R. Sunstein, ‘Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay’, (104) Columbia Law Review 2004, p. 205; C.R. 
Sunstein and E.A. Posner, ‘Dollars and Death’, (72) University of Chicago Law Review 2005, p. 563; W.K. Vis-
cusi, ‘The Flawed Hedonic Damages Measure of Compensation for Wrongful Death and Personal Injury’, Van-
derbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-05 2008, p. 3. The amounts in our paper are, unless noted 
differently, calculated as follows. The American amounts from the original publications are first expressed in 
dollars from 2008 (see http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm). Subsequently we have expressed them 
in Euros on the basis of the most recent Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) as published by the OECD: 0.850 (see 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/54/18598754.pdf). We choose to apply the PPP for the Euro area, but we are 
aware that there are differences between the PPP of the countries within the Euro area. We leave the question 
whether pain and suffering damages should be harmonized within the European Union or if the amounts should 
differ per country untreated in our paper, in order to be able to focus on the relevance of insights from Health 
Economics. Applying the PPP for the Euro area avoids having to list separate amounts for all Member States. 
34  T.R. Miller, ‘Willingness to Pay Comes of Age: Will the System Survive?’, (93) Northwestern University 
Law Review 1989. p. 893, 894. 
35 See M. Johannesson, Theory and Methods of Economic Evaluation of Health Care, Dordrecht: Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers 1996, p. 68; H. R. Taylor, M. L. Pezzullo and J. E. Keeffe, ‘The economic impact and cost of 
visual impairment in Australia’, (90) British Journal of Ophthalmology 2006, p. 274; D. Kenkel, ‘Using Esti-
mates of the Value of a Statistical Life in Evaluating Regulatory Effects’, United States Department of Agricul-
ture Economic Research Service  mp1570d, p. 5  <www.ers.usda.gov/publications/mp1570/mp1570d.pdf>. A. 
Krupnick, ‘Valuing Risk Reductions for Different Hazards’, United States Department of Agriculture Economic 
Research Service  mp1570m, p. 87 however mentions values of (calculated in Euros from 2008)  €55,000 to  
€333,500 <www.ers.usda.gov/publications/mp1570/mp1570m.pdf>. 
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ally reduced.36 The Law and Economics literature, however, does not indicate how to assess 
the relative weight of the different types of immaterial losses.  
Converting VSL/VSLY into pain and suffering damages entails several difficulties. First, the 
assessed values of VSL and VSLY differ greatly. However, by using average values, this dif-
ficulty may be overcome. Second, there is no generally accepted method to determine the rel-
ative weight of different health conditions. Furthermore, in order to determine these relative 
weights, the losses of the victim should be assessed as accurately as possible. Finally, the fact 
that the victim has to describe his own situation in order to assess his relative weight opens 
the possibility of strategic behavior.37  
In our view, insights from Health Economics offer a good reference to reach a relative scaling 
of different health conditions. This way, the Law and Economics ideal of ax ante assessed 
pain and suffering damages may still be attainable. These insights from Health Economics 
form the topic of the next section.  
 
 
4. Insights from Health Economics 
 
4.1 Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) 
 
A QALY is a measure regarding the value of living one year in a certain health condition. 
This health condition is used as a proxy for the quality of life during that year. QALYs are 
often used in evaluating different health programs, medical treatments and techniques.38
In order to be able to calculate QALYs, different health conditions have to be established, 
ranging from perfect health to death and everything in between. Each condition is assigned a 
QALY-weight, varying from 0.00 (death) to 1.00 (perfect health). Conditions which are re-
garded as even worse than death are assigned a negative value. QALYs are calculated as the 
sum of the health conditions of the individual during the time those conditions last. By apply-
ing QALYs, one can form an opinion on the relative value of different treatment possibilities. 
Suppose for example that for a person with a certain ailment two treatments exist which are 
equally expensive. Treatment A increases the quality of life with 0.1 for 5 years, treatment B 
by 0.2 for 3 years. According to the QALY method, treatment B is preferred, because it 
yields 0.6 QALY (0.2*3) while treatment A ‘only’ yields 0.5 QALY for the same amount of 
money.39
Different methods exist for trying to establish QALY weights.40 In some methods, respon-
dents are asked to compare two situations in order to elicit their overall perception of a spe-
                                                
36 Schäfer and Ott 2005, p. 377. Also see Miller 1989, p. 896 ff. 
37 Bovbjerg, Sloan and Blumstein 1989, p. 951, 952. 
38  See e.g. J. Brazier, et al., ‘A review of the use of health status measures in economic evaluation’, (3) Health 
Technology Assessment 1999 p. 3, 4; P. Dolan, ‘The measurement of health related quality of life for use in re-
source allocation decisions in health care’, in: A.J. Culyer and J.P. Newhouse (eds.), Handbook of Health Eco-
nomics, vol. 1B, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V. 2000.; S. Folland, A.C. Goodman and M. Stano, The Eco-
nomics of Health and Health Care, 5th ed., Upper Saddler River (NJ): Prentice Hall 2007, p. 81. 
39 This comparison does not yet show whether treatment A and/or B are worth their costs. For this, one has to 
evaluate how much a QALY is worth in money terms. See Section 4.2 below for this topic. 
40 See e.g. E. Nord, ‘Methods for quality adjustment of life years’, (34) Social Science and Medicine 1992, p. 
561 ff.; M. Johannesson, B. Jönsson and G. Karlsson, ‘Outcome Measurement in Economic Evaluation’, (5) 
Health Economics 1996, p. 283-284; H. Bleichrodt and M. Johannesson, ‘Standard gamble, time trade-off and 
rating scale: experimental results on the ranking properties of QALYs’, (16) Journal of Health Economics 1997, 
p. 155-157; Brazier et al. 1999, p. 23 ff.; Dolan 2000, p. 1733 ff.; U.S. EPA, Office of Research and Develop-
ment, Human Health Metrics for Environmental Decision Support Tools: Lessons from Health Economics and 
Decision Analysis (Sept. 2001) p. 16, 17; J.K. Hammitt, ‘QALYs Versus WTP’, (22) Risk Analysis 2002, p. 
994-996 for a more extensive treatment. 
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cific ailment. In the ‘standard gamble’ method, for example, people are asked to choose be-
tween living in a certain health condition on the one hand, and undergoing treatment which, 
with varying possibilities, leads to either perfect health or death on the other hand. The lowest 
possibility of living in perfect health which the respondents still assess as high enough to un-
dergo the treatment, determines the QALY weight of the ailment. If for instance, I am indif-
ferent between continuing to live with the ailment in question or undergoing a treatment 
which has 70% probability to restore me in perfect health and 30% probability of leading to 
death, then the QALY weight of the ailment is 0.7. In another method, the ‘time trade-off’, 
respondents are asked to trade off x years in perfect health with y years with a certain health 
condition. The ratio x/y determines the QALY weight. Hence, the more life-years the respon-
dent is willing to forego in order to achieve perfect health, the lower the QALY weight for 
the health condition involved. So, if I assess 40 years life expectancy with the ailment as 
equal to 30 years in perfect health, the QALY factor is 0.75. In the ‘person trade-off’, respon-
dents are asked to make a trade-off between improving the health of people in one health 
condition against people in another health condition. Respondents are e.g. asked to choose 
between improving the health or extending life expectancy of x people in the first (better) 
condition and y people in the second (worse) condition.41 The ratio x/y determines the relative 
QALY weights of both conditions. If respondents are e.g. indifferent between extending life 
with one year for 20 healthy people and 25 people with a certain health condition, then the 
QALY-weight of the second health condition is 20/25 = 0.8. In another method, the ‘visual 
analogue scale’, respondents are asked to rank the ailment on a vertical line with concrete 
endpoints ranging from 0 to 100 where 0 represents death and 100 represents perfect health. 
To account for ailments that may be perceived as worse than death the endpoints of the scale 
may be modified to 0 representing the worst imaginable health condition and 100 represent-
ing the best imaginable health condition. Between the endpoints the line is separated by 
equivalent intervals so that the ranking of the ailment yields its QALY weight. For example, 
an ailment rated with 85 points on the scale has a QALY factor of 0.85.  
Other ways used to establish QALY weights are frequently referred to as ‘generic’ or ‘quality 
of life’ measures as they measure general attributes of health conditions without emphasizing 
a particular ailment. One of these measures, the EuroQoL EQ-5D42 questionnaire, differenti-
ates health states using five dimensions: mobility, self care, usual activities, pain/discomfort 
and anxiety/depression. In the first part of the questionnaire, respondents are asked to mark 
their health condition on the basis of these five dimensions by indicating whether they have 
no problems, moderate problems or extreme problems in each dimension. Each of these lev-
els is assigned a weight previously elicited by the visual analogue scale or the time trade off 
method. In the second part, respondents are asked to rank their health condition on a visual 
analogue scale thus communicating their overall perception of the ailment. All possible com-
binations of dimensions and their levels yield 243 different health states to which death and 
unconsciousness are added. The QALY weight for the health state is calculated from the 
overall evaluation of the respondent of all health dimensions by adding up the relevant 
weights and subtracting them from 1.00, i.e. perfect health. Another generic measure, the 
‘Health Utilities Index Mark 3’ (HUI3)43, uses eight dimensions to classify health states: vi-
sion, hearing, speech, ambulation, dexterity, emotion, cognition and pain. Each dimension 
                                                
41 Hammitt 2002, p. 995. See also U.S.EPA 2001, p.17. 
42 See www.euroqol.org/ and especially K. Cheung, M. Oemar, M. Oppe and R. Rabin, ‘EQ-5D User Guide’, 
2009 < http://www.euroqol.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Documenten/PDF/User_Guide_v2_March_2009.pdf >. 
43 See www.fhs.mcmaster.ca/hug/hui3.htm. See also J. Horsman, W. Furlong, D. Feeny and G. Torrance, ‘The 
Health Utilities Index (HUI®): concepts, measurement properties and applications’, (1) Health and Quality of 
Life Outcomes 2003 <http://www.hqlo.com/content/1/1/54>. HUI3 is the most recently developed Health Utili-
ties Index. Previous versions are HUI, HUI1 and HUI2. 
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comprises five or six different levels (speech, emotion and pain have five levels) indicative of 
a gradual deterioration in that dimension. These levels are assigned a weight previously elic-
ited by standard gamble and visual analogue scale methods. Combining all dimensions and 
levels, 972,000 health states can be realized in total. Respondents are asked to indicate how 
much a certain condition affects the various health dimensions. The QALY weight of the 
health condition is calculated by a multiplicative function which accounts for the overall 
evaluation of the respondent of all health dimensions. Other generic measures to elicit QALY 
weights are the ‘Quality of Well Being Scale’, the ‘SF-6D’, the ‘15D’ and the ‘Rosser dis-
ability/distress scale’. However, so far the EQ-5D and the HUI3 are regarded as better meas-
ures for the QALY weight elicitation.44
The different methods lead to different results, among others due to the type of questions be-
ing asked and the comparison being made (with death, perfect health or exactly with another 
ailment). The standard gamble, the time trade off and the person trade off are methods that 
require respondents to compare two different situations on the basis of health (un)certainty, 
health duration and health of other people respectively, whereas the visual analogue scale 
asks for the overall perception of a health state marked on a line, tasks which may be difficult 
for respondents to understand and perform. On the other hand the generic measures with the 
form of questionnaires are easier to understand but since they classify health states on the ba-
sis of specified dimensions there may be other affected aspects of health conditions that these 
measures will not be able to evaluate. Furthermore it is relevant whether the questions are 
asked to people who actually have the ailment or not, to doctors or other health specialists. 
Depending on who answers the questions, results may again be different. If the people who 
suffer the ailment are judged as more competent for the elicitation of QALY weights, the 
question then becomes when to ask them. People can adapt themselves to their life circum-
stances and thus an evaluation of the health condition made when this is first incurred may be 
different from an evaluation in a later period.45 Hence, much research is still needed and re-
finement of methods is necessary in order to acquire more uniform QALY weights for the 
different health conditions.  
 
 
4.2 Pain and Suffering Damages Based on QALYs 
 
Notwithstanding the abovementioned problems, we think that the insights that are acquired in 
Health Economics so far are of great value for the topic of pain and suffering damages. Obvi-
ously the results have to be handled with care due to the problems discussed above. However, 
in our view, even with the restrictions that still exist, it is better to base the damages for dete-
riorations in health conditions on the results of this specialized research than on the amounts 
that courts have awarded in the past. After all, there is no reason to assume in advance that 
these judgments approximate the amounts which would do justice to the gravity of the imma-
terial loss.  
On the basis of the extensive Health Economics literature in which assessments of QALY 
profits of different treatments and medical interventions are being made, educated assess-
ments of the average QALY loss due to health impairments can be made. This, in our view, 
enables the relative ranking of immaterial losses mentioned in Section 3.2. By subsequently 
attaching a money value to a QALY, pain and suffering damages may be determined.46 This 
                                                
44 See Brazier et al. 1999, p.76. 
45 Dolan 2000, p. 1738, 1739. 
46 See e.g. M. Johannesson and M.C. Weinstein, ‘On the decision rules of cost-effectiveness analysis’, (12) 
Journal of Health Economics 1993, p. 466; H. Bleichrodt and J. Quiggin, ‘Life-cycle preferences over consump-
tion and health: when is cost-effectiveness analysis equivalent to cost–benefit analysis?’, (18) Journal of Health 
10 
Karapanou and Visscher - Pain and Suffering Damages 
can be done by evaluating alternative treatments in terms of the QALYs they generate and the 
costs to be implemented. By comparing the costs of the health treatments per QALY gained 
one arrives at a potential money value for QALY. Another way is to calculate the willingness 
to pay for a QALY increase. A recent overview of literature which attaches a money value to 
a QALY47 indicates that authors who have calculated the ‘willingness to pay’ for a QALY 
reach a value of about €100,000 to €150,000. Others look for the limits below/above which 
an additional QALY is worth/not worth its costs and arrive at an upper limit of about 
€184,000. The famous ‘kidney dialysis value’, which is based on the consideration that kid-
ney dialysis is regarded as a method which is (more than) worth its costs, poses a lower limit 
of about €79,500 to €102,000 for one QALY. The English National Institute for Clinical Ex-
cellence (NICE) uses a lower limit of about €32,500 to €48,500, which in most literature is 
regarded as too low.48 In an overview from 2000, where the value of a QALY is deduced 
from VSL-research, an amount of €306,000 is mentioned as median value of the different es-
timates (28 of the 35 estimates exceed €113,000).49  
Different than with the VSL(Y), the QALY only regards immaterial losses, because it relates 
to the impact of medical conditions on the quality of life, not on the wealth of the affected 
individual. Hence, the applied QALY value does not have to be reduced by a fraction expres-
sion the pecuniary loss. 
 
 
5. Magnitude of Pain and Suffering Damages: Legal and Economic Standards Compared 
 
5.1 Legal and Economic Standards 
 
Many countries recognize non-pecuniary losses as compensable, although significant differ-
ences exist in the situations in which these damages are granted, the legal basis on which they 
are grounded and the magnitude of the damages.50 In case law, several factors are distin-
guished which are relevant in determining the magnitude of pain and suffering damages, such 
as the nature, duration and intensity of pain, grief and forgone joy of life, decreased life ex-
pectancy, remaining impairments, psychological problems, et cetera. Especially the nature 
and extent of the injuries have a large influence on the final magnitude.51 Therefore, the 
QALY, where the type of health impairment determines the QALY weight, in our view forms 
a good basis to determine the pain and suffering damages. After all, the more serious the 
health impairment is, the lower the QALY level of the victim will be, and the longer the 
                                                                                                                                                     
Economics 1999, p. 683 ff.; P. Dolan and R. Edlin, ‘Is it really possible to build a bridge between cost-benefit 
analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis?’ (21) Journal of Health Economics 2002, p. 828; T. Klose, ‘A utility-
theoretic model for QALYs and willingness to pay’, (12) Health Economics 2003. Also see the EuroVaQ pro-
ject which aims at developing robust methods to determine the monetary value of a QALY across a number of 
European Member States: <http://research.ncl.ac.uk/eurovaq/index.html>. 
47 D. Kenkel, ‘WTP- and QALY-Based Approaches to Valuing Health for Policy: Common Ground and Dis-
puted Territory’, (34) Environmental & Resource Economics 2006, p. 421. 
48 M. Pomp, W. Brouwer and F. Rutten, QALY-tijd. Nieuwe medische technologie, kosteneffectiviteit en richtlij-
nen, Den Haag: Centraal Planbureau 2007, p. 37. <www.cpb.nl/nl/pub/cpbreeksen/document/152/doc152.pdf>. 
See p. 39 for other research that yields low values. 
49 R.A. Hirth, M.E. Chernew, E. Miller, M. Fendrick and W.G. Weissert, ‘Willingness to Pay for a Quality-
adjusted Life Year: In Search of a Standard’, (20) Medical Decision Making 2000, p. 338, 340. 
50 For an extensive overview, see Rogers 2001; B.A. Koch and H. Koziol, ‘Comparative Analysis’, in: B.A. 
Koch and H. Koziol (eds.), Compensation for Personal Injury in a Comparative Perspective, Vienna: Springer 
2002, p. 424 ff.; G. Comandé, ‘Towards a Global Model for Adjudicating Personal Injury Damages: Bridging 
Europe and the United States’, (19) Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 2005, p. 247. 
51 Lindenbergh 1998, p. 235 ff. The same idea shows from Rogers 2001, Comandé 2005, p. 260 ff. and L. Jaeger 
and J. Luckey, Schmerzensgeld (4th edition), Münster: ZAP Verlag 2008, p. 212 ff.   
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health impairment lasts, the higher the total QALY decrease of the victim will turn out. Fur-
thermore, this measure exactly expresses the non-pecuniary losses, because it regards the 
quality of life. Hence, the resulting amounts are exclusive of any additional pecuniary losses. 
The magnitude of pain and suffering damages differs between countries. In the Netherlands, 
for example, the granted damages are often lower than in other European countries52 and the 
United States.53 The highest amount in the Netherlands was about €192,000, in for instance 
Germany €614,000, in Italy €1,024,000, in England €330,000, but for instance in Sweden 
€122,000 and in Denmark €88,500. This raises the question regarding the correct magnitude 
of pain and suffering damages. This question cannot be answered by merely comparing the 
amounts granted in different countries, because that method lacks an external yardstick. In 
order to answer the question, we therefore use the insights developed in Sections 3 and 4 and 
compare those insights with a number of concrete cases from different countries.54
In the sections below, we provide information on the amounts of pain and suffering damages 
that were granted for a number of specific injuries in several European countries. Subse-
quently we compare these amounts with insights from the field of Health Economics, where 
QALY weights for the selected medical conditions are assessed. The Health Economics re-
search in this area is extensive. We have chosen to only use publications which receive a 
quality score of at least 4.5 on a scale ranging from 1.0 to 7.0 indicating lowest and highest 
quality respectively. The quality scores can be derived from the Cost-effectiveness Analysis 
Registry (CEA) of the Center for the Evaluation of Value & Risk in Health from Tufts Medi-
cal Center.55
It is important to note that in the Health Economics literature, the passing of time is relevant. 
Costs of medical treatment may be incurred today while the benefits only occur in the future. 
Furthermore, the costs of medical treatment may be recurring during a certain period. Be-
cause of this passing of time, costs and benefits are discounted. Often the studies contain a 
sensitivity analysis using different discount rates to evaluate the exact influence of the dis-
count factor.56 As far as we know, there is no common opinion on the ‘correct’ discount fac-
tor in Health Economics research. In practice, a discount factor of about 3-5% is often ap-
plied.57 It is undisputed that the costs of medical treatment should be discounted, because 
spending the money comes at the opportunity cost of investing it and receiving a return. 
There has been discussion, however, whether the benefits realized in the future should also be 
discounted, because they do not concern money which can be invested, but rather increases in 
the quality of life. However, in order to account for the time preference, also benefits should 
be discounted, but not necessarily with the same factor as the costs.58 The NICE in its previ-
ous guidelines applied a discount factor of 6% for costs and 1.5% for health benefits. In a 
more recent version of the guidelines, both rates were set at 3.5%. According to Brouwer et 
al., this is wrong, because it does not incorporate the fact that the monetary value of health 
                                                
52 See Lindenbergh 2006, p. 10. The amounts mentioned in the text above are derived from this overview. 
53 A. Sebok, ‘Translating the Immeasurable: Thinking About Pain and Suffering Comparatively’, (55) DePaul 
Law Review 2006, p. 392; S.D. Sugarman, ‘A Comparative Law Look at Pain and Suffering Awards’, (55) De 
Paul Law Review 2006, p. 418. 
54 Utilizing the insights from Health Economics in our view solves the issue discussed by Rogers 2001, p. 248 
that ‘damages for non-pecuniary losses are certainly arbitrary in the sense that it is difficult to find a logical ba-
sis on which damages for quadriplegia should be €300,000 rather than, say, €30,000 of €3,000,000’. In a similar 
sense, see Comandé 2005, p. 301 ff. 
55 See https://research.tufts-nemc.org/cear/default.aspx. 
56 See e.g. D.J. Torgerson and J. Raftery, ‘Discounting’, British Medical Journal 1999, p. 915.  
57 W.B.F. Brouwer et al., ‘Need for differential discounting of costs and health effects in cost effectiveness 
analyses’, British Medical Journal 2005, p. 446. 
58 Torgerson and Raftery 1999, p. 915. 
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effects is expected to grow over time. They therefore argue that the discount factor for health 
effects should be lower than the discount factor for costs.59
Be this as it may, for the purpose of our paper, a different type of discounting is necessary. 
We will use the insights from the Health Economics literature regarding the impact of medi-
cal conditions on the quality of life. This way, we assess the non-pecuniary loss caused by 
personal injuries. By relating this to a monetary value for a QALY, we derive a monetary ex-
pression of this non-pecuniary loss. After having done so, we still have to account for the du-
ration of the medical condition. For example, if the monetary expression of a certain injury 
would amount to €10,000 per year during a period of ten years, the damages should not sim-
ply be assessed at €100,000 but at the net present value of ten annual future payments of 
€10,000. The exact outcome depends on the discount factor being applied. A discount factor 
of 4% would result in a lump sum payment of €84,353 while a discount factor of 6% would 
lead to €78,017. In this paper, we will apply a discount factor of 4%, which is higher than the 
rate of 2.5% set in the United Kingdom60 and the 3.5% suggested by NICE. Weir et al. in 
their periodical revision on interest rates in the Expert Witness Newsletter argue that for Can-
ada, a discount factor of a maximum of 3% should be applied.61 In our view, choosing a dis-
count factor of 4% avoids the risk of overestimating the monetary value of non-pecuniary 
losses due to inadequate discounting. 
 
 
5.2 Concrete Cases 
 
5.2.1 Spinal Cord Lesion / Paralysis 
 
In cases of spinal cord lesion, in the Netherlands damages in the amount of €70,000 to 
€124,000 are granted, depending on the position of the lesion, remaining pain, possible influ-
ence on fertility, incontinence et cetera.62 In a Dutch case from 1999, the Appellate Court 
granted € 90,756 in pain and suffering damages to a 25 year old victim who was paralyzed in 
an accident due to a spinal cord lesion. Expressed in Euros from 2006, this would be € 
111,630.63 In Germany, a 25 year old man who suffered a spinal cord lesion in an accident 
for which he was comparatively negligent for 1/3 received €150,000.64 In another German 
case, the court awarded €200,000 to a victim who was paralyzed from the neck down due to a 
spinal cord lesion. In other cases, even higher amounts were awarded.65 The highest German 
award in pain and suffering damages, as already mentioned, were awarded for a high spinal 
cord lesion of a 3.5 year old boy who cannot breathe on his own anymore, who suffers from 
remaining pain and also suffered other injuries: €614,000. In Greece, €250,000 was granted 
to a 23 year old woman who suffered from quadriplegia due to a spinal cord lesion.66 In an-
other Greek case, the court awarded €128,000 to a 25 year old man who was found compara-
tively negligent by 40% for the accident that resulted in his paralysis due to a spinal cord le-
sion.67 In Italy the amount of €1,024,128 was awarded to an 18 year old victim who was ren-
                                                
59 Brouwer et al. 2005, p. 447. 
60 See e.g. W.S. Chan and F.W.H. Chan, ‘On selection of the discount rate for actuarial assessment of damages 
in personal injury litigation in Hong Kong’, (2) Law, Probability and Risk 2003, p. 17. 
61 L. Weir et al., ‘The Discount Rate Revisited (Spring 2008)’, (13) Expert Witness newsletter 2008, 
http://www.economica.ca/ew13_1p1.htm. 
62 ANWB Smartengeld, p. 114 ff. The amounts are expressed in Euros from 2006. 
63 ANWB Smartengeld, p. 116. 
64 Jaeger and Luckey 2008, p. 1067. 
65 Jaeger and Luckey 2008, p. 1068 ff. 
66 Kalamata Court of First Instance 107/2003, online in NOMOS: http://lawdb.intrasoftnet.com/index.php. 
67 Leukada Court of First Instance 472/2004, online in NOMOS: http://lawdb.intrasoftnet.com/index.php. 
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dered paralyzed due to spinal cord lesion after a car accident.68 The victim’s young age and 
the severity of the injury (85% paralysis) increased the damage award.  
In a publication from 1999, a cost effectiveness research regarding Computed Tomography 
(CT) scans for trauma patients was published. Major trauma patients arriving at a trauma cen-
ter are assumed to have unstable cervical spine injuries, until proven differently. In order to 
establish if this type of injury indeed exists, the standard procedure is a radiographic scan, 
which however does not always show the injury. The more expensive CT scan provides bet-
ter information. The article investigates whether the better results of the CT scan are worth 
the costs.69 The utility adjustments caused by the spinal injury are estimated with the use of 
the HUI2. The QALY weight of paralysis is assessed at 0.516 (ranging from 0.465 to 
0.611).70
Assuming a non-perfect health before the paralysis, e.g. a QALY weight of 0.9, the decrease 
due to the paralysis is 0.384 (0.9 – 0.516). If we apply a conservative monetary value of a 
QALY of €50,000,71 which is lower than the amounts resulting from the literature we dis-
cussed in Section 4.2, pain and suffering damages can be calculated as follows. Every year, 
the paralysis has lowered the quality of life of the victim by 0.384 QALY, which in monetary 
terms equals €19,200 (0.384 * €50,000). Assuming an average life expectancy of 78 years, a 
25-year old victim has 54 years of remaining life expectancy. The pain and suffering dam-
ages hence are calculated as the net present value of 54 payments of €19,200, which amounts 
to €439,000. This is substantially higher than the amounts most often awarded by the Dutch, 
German and Greek courts.72 The highest German amount is well in line with the proposed 
approach, if one takes into consideration that the victim there was even younger and that we 
use a low monetary value of €50,000. The Italian amount in our view seems too high. 
 
 
5.2.2 Loss of an Eye 
 
Pain and suffering damages for the loss of an eye greatly differ per country. In the Nether-
lands the amounts are about €22,000. Italy and Greece granted the highest amounts (€80,000 
and €88,000 respectively), Austria the lowest (€14,500).73 The amounts granted however 
greatly differ per case. For example, in Germany a woman who suffered from inflammation 
of the cerebral membrane due to her contact lenses and was blinded to one eye received 
€20,000 in pain and suffering damages.74 On the other hand, a 12 year old boy lost an eye in 
an accident in which he was found comparatively negligent for 1/3 and he received €125,000. 
                                                
68 Savona Court of First Instance, 29 July 2005, online in De Jure: 
http://dejure.giuffre.it/psixsite/PaginePubbliche/default.aspx 
69 C.C. Blackmore et al., ‘Cervical Spine Screening with CT in Trauma Patients: A Cost-effectiveness Analy-
sis’, Radiology 1999, p. 117. The quality of this research is a 5.5 on a scale from 1.0 to 7.0, see 
https://research.tufts-nemc.org/cear/search/detail.aspx?ArticleId=1999-01-02064. 
70 Blackmore et al. 1999, p. 121, 122. 
71 We have chosen to apply this low estimate of €50,000 to reduce the risk of overestimation of pain and suffer-
ing damages. As will become apparent in the remainder of the paper, the calculated amounts are already (much) 
higher than the amounts currently awarded in most countries. Given the possible problems in applying 
monetized QALY values in tort law, which we have discussed in the text above, we want to avoid the possible 
risk of overestimated damages. By applying a very low estimate of €50,000, our plea to substantially increase 
pain and suffering damages cannot be rejected by arguing that we have chosen a too high money value for a 
QALY. 
72 If one also wants to incorporate a normal expected worsening of health over time, the QALY decrease in later 
years will be lower, resulting in a lower final amount. 
73 For Italy and Austria see Lindenbergh 2006, p. 10. For Greece see the published court decisions online in 
NOMOS: http://lawdb.intrasoftnet.com/index.php. 
74 Jaeger and Luckey 2008, p. 411. 
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The fact that he has lost an eye at such a young age, which forces him to constantly be careful 
in order to protect his remaining eye, has increased the award granted.75 In Greece, a 43 year 
old mother of two received about €88,000 in pain and suffering damages for complete loss of 
vision in her left eye.76 In another case, €80,000 was awarded to a 36 year old man who was 
injured to one eye by a flare and lost 80% of his vision77. However, a 46 year old man whose 
left eye was destroyed after someone kicked him in the face only received about €29,000.78   
We did not find a QALY weight for the loss of an eye as such, but there is relevant informa-
tion to be found in other research. In a publication from 2003, a cost-utility analysis of cata-
ract surgery in the second eye after a successful treatment of the first eye is carried out.79 Ear-
lier research already showed that surgery to the first eye is very cost-effective.80 Furthermore, 
different research suggests that the quality of life in patients with bilateral good vision is sub-
stantially higher than that of patients with unilateral good vision.81 Hence, this research pro-
vides information on the difference in QALY value between sight with one eye and with two 
eyes. The total QALY gains of cataract surgery to the second eye per patient are estimated at 
1.31 QALY,82 which would result in €65,500 if the conservative value of €50,000 per QALY 
would be used. It is important to note that this cataract research regards older people, who 
had a remaining life expectancy of 12 years. For younger victims with a longer remaining life 
expectancy, the total QALY gains will be proportionally higher. The already mentioned lit-
erature which compares the quality of life between unilateral and bilateral good vision sug-
gests a difference of 0.08 QALY. We use this QALY-difference of seeing with one eye and 
seeing with two eyes as an estimate for the loss of the quality of life if one loses sight in one 
eye. Hence, for a person with a remaining life expectancy of 36 years and a QALY loss of 
0.08 per year, pain and suffering damages would result in about €79,000.83 Due to the rela-
tive low estimate of €50,000 per QALY, the resulting amounts are still relatively low, but 
substantially higher than in most European countries, apart from Italy and Greece. What is 
observable in case law, is that age of the victim indeed seems to have an influence. In the 
German cases, the young age of the victim was explicitly mentioned as a reason to increase 








                                                
75 Jaeger and Luckey 2008, p. 423. 
76 Simvoulio tis Epikratias (Council of State)  2739/2007, online in NOMOS: 
http://lawdb.intrasoftnet.com/index.php. 
77 Athens Administrative Court of First Instance 3441/2006, online in NOMOS: 
http://lawdb.intrasoftnet.com/index.php. 
78 Dodekanese Court of Appeal 307/2005, online in NOMOS: http://lawdb.intrasoftnet.com/index.php. 
79 B.G. Busbee et al., ‘Cost-Utility Analysis of Cataract Surgery in the Second Eye’, (110) Ophthalmology 2003, 
p. 2310-2317. The quality of this research is a 4.5 on a scale from 1.0 to 7.0, see https://research.tufts-
nemc.org/cear/search/detail.aspx?ArticleId=2003-01-00510. 
80 B.G. Busbee et al., ‘Incremental Cost-effectiveness of Initial Cataract Surgery’, (109) Ophthalmology 2002, p. 
609. 
81 M.M. Brown et al, ‘Quality of Life Associated with Unilateral and Bilateral Good Vision’, (108) Ophthal-
mology 2001, p. 645. 
82 Busbee et al. 2003, p. 2313. 
83 The net present value of 36 payments of €4,000 (0.08 * €50.000), applying a discount factor of 4%, equals 
€78,658. 
84 Lindenbergh 2006, p. 76 ff. 
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The highest amounts in pain and suffering damages for ear injuries in the Netherlands are 
about €42,543 and €61,828 for severe deafness to both ears with a child aged 5 and a baby 
due to medical treatment.85
There is extensive cost-utility research regarding cochlear implants, which are hearing de-
vices which are implanted in the inner ear, as opposed to the more traditional acoustic hearing 
devices. In this research, it is investigated whether these cochlear implants increase the qual-
ity of life enough to be worth their additional costs. Summerfield et al. investigated whether 
bilateral cochlear implants rather than unilateral implants are cost-effective.86 The benefits of 
unilateral cochlear implants include enhanced social and professional participation for adults 
and increased integration in mainstream education for children. Cochlear implants do not on-
ly benefit patients with whom acoustic hearing devices did not work (the ‘traditional candi-
dates’), but also improve hearing of patients who already benefited from acoustic hearing de-
vices (the ‘marginal hearing aid user’). Bilateral implants improve the ability to understand 
speech in noise and to locate sources of sounds. In the research, the Mark II Health Utilities 
Index was used to measure utilities. The research found that the QALY loss as result of pro-
foundly impaired hearing (and related, speech) is 0.281 for traditional candidates and 0.145 
for marginal hearing aid users.87
Again assuming a value of €50,000 per QALY, deafness on both ears would then be assessed 
at about €14,000 per year for those who do not benefit from acoustic devices, and € 7,250 for 
those who do. For the two Dutch cases, again assuming a life expectancy of 78 years, this 
would result in amounts of about €345,000 if acoustic devices do not benefit the patient and 
€178,000 if they do.88
 
 
5.2.4 Amputation of foot and lower extremities 
 
It is difficult to assess the pain and suffering damages for amputation of the foot or lower ex-
tremities, because in many cases the victim also suffered other injuries. In the Netherlands,89 
a 31 year old motor driver was involved in a traffic accident which resulted in the amputation 
of his lower leg. He has received almost €56,000 in a settlement. A 54 year old woman who 
                                                
85 ANWB Smartengeld, p. 81. 
86 A.Q. Summerfield et al., ‘A Cost-Utility Scenario Analysis of Bilateral Cochlear Implantation’, Archives of 
Otolaryngology Head & Neck Surgery 2002, p. 1255-1262. The quality of this research is a 5.0 on a scale from 
1.0 to 7.0, see https://research.tufts-nemc.org/cear/search/detail.aspx?ArticleId=2002-01-00877. 
87 Summerfield et al. 2002, p. 1259. Research that focused on older patients found a mean increase in utility of 
0.24. This overall increase is based on the HUI-3 and consists of +0.15 (hearing), +0.11 (emotion), +0.02 
(speech), -0.01 (ambulation), -0.01 (cognition) and -0.01 (pain). See H.W. Francis et al., ‘Impact of Cochlear 
Implants on the Functional Health Status of Older Adults’, (112) The Laryngoscope 2002, p. 1484. The quality 
of this research is a 4.5 on a scale from 1.0 to 7.0, see https://research.tufts-
nemc.org/cear/search/detail.aspx?ArticleId=2002-01-00969. Research that, to the opposite, focused on children, 
found increases in utility ranging from 0.22 to 0.39, depending on the method used (time trade-off, visual ana-
logue scale or HUI-3). See A.K. Cheng et al., ‘Cost-Utility Analysis of the Cochlear Implant in Children’, The 
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) 2000, p. 855. The quality of this research is a 5.5 on a 
scale from 1.0 to 7.0, see https://research.tufts-nemc.org/cear/search/detail.aspx?ArticleId=2000-01-02130. 
88 Please note that the UK Cochlear Implant Study Group, ‘Criteria of Candidacy for Unilateral Cochlear Im-
plantation in Postlingually Deafened Adults II: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis’, (25) Ear and Hearing, p. 342 ap-
plied a discount factor of 6%, which would lead to amounts of €245,000 resp. €127,000. This is still signifi-
cantly higher than the amounts granted in most countries. The quality of this research is a 6.0 on a scale from 
1.0 to 7.0, see https://research.tufts-nemc.org/cear/search/detail.aspx?ArticleId=2004-01-00225. 
89ANWB Smartengeld, p. 43. 
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was overrun by a garbage truck had her left leg amputated just above the knee. She received 
about €45,500 in pain and suffering damages. In Germany, a trolley driver received €12,500 
regarding amputation of the forefoot in a case in which he was 50% comparatively negli-
gent.90 In a case in which a young woman was involved in a motor accident and had her 
lower leg amputated, pain and suffering damages were set at €40,000.91 In Greece, €150,000 
was awarded to a 27 year old man after a car accident which resulted to the amputation of his 
leg just below the knee.92 In another traffic accident case, a minor received €170,000 in pain 
and suffering damages for having her left leg amputated just below the knee.93 However, the 
court only granted about €58,700 to a 32 year old man who was involved in a work related 
accident and had his lower leg amputated.94 In Italy, a man received €135,000 in pain and 
suffering damages for amputation of his foot after an accident.95
In health economic literature regarding foot ulcers, relevant information on the impact of a 
foot amputation on the quality of life can be found. Increasing preventive efforts in diabetic 
patients can lower the probability of foot ulcers and amputations, and the research investi-
gates whether these benefits are worth the costs.96 Information is provided on the quality of 
life as indicated by people without foot ulcers, patients with ongoing foot ulcers, after pri-
mary healing of a foot ulcer, after healing with minor amputation and after healing with ma-
jor amputation. A possible problem with using this information is that it is all related to peo-
ple with a foot ulcer before an amputation. Nonetheless, it may be instructive to review the 
information. The difference in QALY value between people with no ulcer and people who 
have healed with major amputation is 0.49.97 In order to better focus on the impact of the 
amputation itself, it is in our view better to compare the QALY value of the latter group with 
those after primary healing of a foot ulcer, and then the difference is 0.29. 
In another research it was investigated whether compression stockings in patients with 
chronic venous stasis are a cost-effective instrument in reducing the probability of recurrence 
of ulcerations. In that research, the decrease in utility due to amputation of lower extremities 
is assessed at 0.26.98
Yet another research regards limb-threatening ischemia. The decrease in utility of patients 
due to amputation of lower extremities who were still ambulant after the amputation ranges 
from 0.3 to 0.35, depending if it is compared with the utility of patients who were cured after 
revascularization or with patients who were only cured after multiple revascularization.99 The 
amputation may regard more than just the foot, which may explain the higher QALY loss. 
                                                
90 Jaeger and Luckey 2008, p. 779. 
91 Jaeger and Luckey 2008, p. 776. The plaintiff claimed €50,000 but because of the poor financial situation and 
the lack of insurance of the injurer, who was the boyfriend of the victim, the court only granted €40,000. 
92 Drama Court of First Instance 124/2004, online in NOMOS: http://lawdb.intrasoftnet.com/index.php. 
93 Thessaloniki Court of Appeal 2601/2006, Armenopoulos 2007, p. 1921.  
94 Areios Pagos (Supreme Court) 961/2007, online in NOMOS: http://lawdb.intrasoftnet.com/index.php.  
95 Corte di Cassazione (Highest Court of Appeal) n. 25751, 24th October 2008, online in De Jure: 
http://dejure.giuffre.it/psixsite/PaginePubbliche/default.aspx    
96 See e.g. G. Ragnarson Tellvall and J. Apelqvist, ‘Prevention of diabetes-related foot ulcers and amputations: a 
cost-utility analysis based on Markov model simulations’, (44) Diabetologica 2001, p. 2077. The quality of this 
research is a 5.0 on a scale from 1.0 to 7.0, see https://research.tufts-
nemc.org/cear/search/detail.aspx?ArticleId=2001-01-02190. 
97 Ragnarson Tellvall and Apelqvist 2001, p. 2079. Also see G. Ragnarson Tellvall and J. Apelqvist, ‘Health-
related quality of life in patients with diabetes mellitus and foot ulcers’, (14) Journal of Diabetes and Its Com-
plications 2000, p. 238. 
98 P. Korn et al., ‘Why insurers should reimburse for compression stockings in patients with chronic venous sta-
sis’, (35) Journal of Vascular Surgery 2002, p. 952. The quality of this research is a 5.5 on a scale from 1.0 to 
7.0, see https://research.tufts-nemc.org/cear/search/detail.aspx?ArticleId=2002-01-01030. 
99 T.E. Brothers et al., ‘Justification of intervention for limb-threatening ischemia: a surgical decision analysis’, 
(7) Cardiovascular Surgery 1999, p. 65. The quality of this research is a 4.5 on a scale from 1.0 to 7.0, see 
https://research.tufts-nemc.org/cear/search/detail.aspx?ArticleId=1999-01-02038. 
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If we would again apply the €50,000 monetary value of a QALY, again it becomes clear that 
the amounts granted for pain and suffering damages in the cases discussed are too low from 
an economic point of view. Using a 0.26 QALY decrease, which is the lowest from the re-
search we have discussed, an amputation in a 54 year old victim would result in about 





The conclusion from the above analysis is that pain and suffering damages as awarded in le-
gal cases are too low from an economic perspective. It is not possible to exactly calculate the 
correct magnitude of those damages, first because there is no consensus over the monetary 
value of the QALY, VSL or VSLY. Second, there are different ways to assess the relative 
weight of different health impairments, leading to diverging results. Third, QALYs are in-
tended to evaluate different health programs, treatment methods and techniques regarding 
their cost-effectiveness, not to calculate damages. Notwithstanding these caveats, we still 
think that using the information that can be derived from QALY studies is a better method to 
determine pain and suffering damages than merely looking at the amounts that were granted 
in the past. After all, those amounts provide no indication regarding the correctness of the 
magnitude, because that requires an external framework. By basing our calculations on a very 
conservative estimation of the monetary value of a QALY (€50,000), we feel that the result-
ing amounts do not lead to an overestimation of the immaterial losses. This holds even more 
as we apply a relatively high discount factor of 4%. Further developments in health economic 
literature in our view therefore will more likely lead to upward adjustments of the resulting 
amounts than downward. 
In order to be able to reach the prevention goal as defined in the Law and Economics litera-
ture, increases in pain and suffering damages are required, because the injurer with the cur-
rent amounts does not fully internalize the externalities caused by his activities. The legal 
compensation goal is also served by such an increase. After all, if damages should aim at re-
storing the balance,100 they should express the gravity of the losses caused by the injurer. In 
as far as independent weight is attached to the goal of appeasement, pain and suffering dam-
ages should also be based on the gravity of the immaterial losses. Hence, both from a legal as 
from a Law and Economics point of view, the magnitude of pain and suffering damages 
should be increased.  
If the pain and suffering damages would indeed be increased, insurance premiums will rise 
because the coverage has to be extended. Would this lead to the situation where activities be-
come too expensive and people are covered against immaterial losses against their will? In 
our view not. First, the resulting amounts are based on the expenses a potential victim would 
be willing to make in order to reduce the probability of these losses occurring. This does not 
lead to a higher coverage than he would have wanted to take himself. Second, in the current 
situation the opposite situation exists: because immaterial losses are not fully incorporated 
into the damages, many activities which cause losses are too cheap and are therefore carried 
out too often.  
The increase in insurance premiums in our view will not lead to uninsurability. That problem 
is not primarily caused by the size of the covered amount, but rather by the uncertainty of the 
expected risk.101 Economic insights may lead to a better predictability of the magnitude of 
                                                
100 Which, according to Lindenbergh 1998, p. 34 is the purpose of compensation.. 
101 M. Faure, ‘The View from Law and Economics’, in: G. Wagner (ed.), Tort Law and Liability Insurance, Vi-
enna: Springer 2005, p. 251, 252. 
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pain and suffering damages, which would lead to better assessment of the expected risk than 
in the current situation.  
 
Much additional research is needed to provide more clarity regarding the way in which in-
formation from cost effectiveness research of health care can be utilized in tort law, regarding 
the assessment of QALY weights, the choice between QALY and VSL(Y), the possible prob-
lem that QALY research regards improvements in health due to medical treatment whereas 
tort law regards decreases in health due to accidents,102 insights from research regarding ad-
aptation,103 et cetera. Refining the answers to these questions enables a better assessment of 
the ‘correct’ magnitude of pain and suffering damages. We hope that our paper has already 
made clear that, from a legal point of view as well as from a health economic and Law and 
Economics perspective, enough reasons exist to regard the current amounts as too low and 




                                                
102 This may be relevant due to the issue of loss aversion, which implies that risk averse people weigh a loss of a 
certain size more heavily than a gain of the same size. If this would be taken into account, the QALY values 
used may still be an underestimation of the losses. 
103 This research suggests that people have a great capacity to adapt to their situation. This could imply that the 
utility loss due to deterioration in health decreases over time, because people adapt to e.g. their disability. This 
issue could be incorporated by e.g. choosing a higher discount factor, or by only using QALY values which are 
based on patient reports rather than on reports by medical experts or volunteers. After all, the patients may pro-
vide assessments in which the adaptation is already incorporated. 
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